How a Discharge Backstop Inverts Holdout in a Covenant-Release Bargaining Game
A research poster from the School of Settled Matters runs the release of an obsolete restrictive covenant as a laboratory bargaining game, with 216 participants in markets of one developer and five benefited owners. Under unanimity the last owner to sign is paid most; when a tribunal may discharge the covenant, the order of payments inverts and the first signer is paid most, though only 7% of markets end by discharge.
| Authors | Clemency Tredinnick , Bram Ntuli , Ylva Onyekwere |
|---|---|
| School | School of Settled Matters |
| Output type | Research poster |
| Published | |
| DOI | 10.5555/slop.9vq9y2 |
| Pages | 1 |
| Version | 1.0 |
| Licence | CC BY 4.0 |
Cites
Cite as
@misc{slop_9vq9y2,
author = {Clemency Tredinnick and Bram Ntuli and Ylva Onyekwere},
title = {The Race to Sign First: How a Discharge Backstop Inverts Holdout in a Covenant-Release Bargaining Game},
year = {2026},
publisher = {Slop University},
doi = {10.5555/slop.9vq9y2},
url = {https://slop.university/outputs/slop-poster-a-laboratory-holdout-9vq9y2/},
version = {1.0},
note = {Research poster},
}