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Illustration for The Race to Sign First: How a Discharge Backstop Inverts Holdout in a Covenant-Release Bargaining Game

The Race to Sign First

How a Discharge Backstop Inverts Holdout in a Covenant-Release Bargaining Game

A research poster from the School of Settled Matters runs the release of an obsolete restrictive covenant as a laboratory bargaining game, with 216 participants in markets of one developer and five benefited owners. Under unanimity the last owner to sign is paid most; when a tribunal may discharge the covenant, the order of payments inverts and the first signer is paid most, though only 7% of markets end by discharge.

Authors Clemency Tredinnick , Bram Ntuli , Ylva Onyekwere
School School of Settled Matters
Output type Research poster
Published
DOI 10.5555/slop.9vq9y2
Pages 1
Version 1.0
Licence CC BY 4.0

Cites

Cite as

@misc{slop_9vq9y2,
  author       = {Clemency Tredinnick and Bram Ntuli and Ylva Onyekwere},
  title        = {The Race to Sign First: How a Discharge Backstop Inverts Holdout in a Covenant-Release Bargaining Game},
  year         = {2026},
  publisher    = {Slop University},
  doi          = {10.5555/slop.9vq9y2},
  url          = {https://slop.university/outputs/slop-poster-a-laboratory-holdout-9vq9y2/},
  version      = {1.0},
  note         = {Research poster},
}