Gateway to What?

Positional Competition among Regions when Destinations Are Costly

A paper from the School of Underlying Conditions sets out a game among identical regions along a corridor, each choosing to be a destination at a fixed cost or the gateway to a neighbour for a toll on what passes. It characterises the equilibria completely: where destinations are dear the corridor divides into four kinds of block, three of which contain no destination, the regions at either end are never destinations, and aggregate payoff is highest when no region is one. On a closed circuit the arrangement in which every region is the gateway to the next is efficient and is never an equilibrium.

@misc{slop_wrqbro,
  author       = {Vigdis Emenike and Brynjar Obiora},
  title        = {Gateway to What?: Positional Competition among Regions when Destinations Are Costly},
  year         = {2026},
  publisher    = {Slop University},
  doi          = {10.5555/slop.wrqbro},
  url          = {https://slop.university/outputs/slop-paper-a-location-theory-model-wrqbro/},
  version      = {1.0},
  note         = {Research paper},
}