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Smaller offers close more machine deals, Emergent Priorities poster finds

Smaller offers close more machine deals, Emergent Priorities poster finds

A research poster from the School of Emergent Priorities finds that software agents negotiating against a deadline reach agreement more often when each counter-offer changes only one or two terms, because their offers cost less to read.

When reading a counter-offer spends the deadline, negotiating agents that change less agree more often

How long should a machine take to read an offer? For the negotiating software agents studied in Fewer Edits, More Deals, a new research poster from the School of Emergent Priorities, the answer goes a long way towards deciding whether a deal is reached at all.

The poster is the work of Ms Gunnhild Ekwueme, Doctoral Candidate, with Dr Mirela Hanke of the School of Continuous Improvement and Dr Anouk Mensah, Postdoctoral Fellow.

We set out to study software and ended up looking harder at our own correspondence. The School has learned a good deal this year about what it asks of the people who have to read what it sends.

— Ms Gunnhild Ekwueme, Doctoral Candidate, School of Emergent Priorities

Across 27,648 simulated negotiations, the team brought concession behaviour, preference elicitation and deadline pressure together into a single account of agent-to-agent agreement, placing the legibility of an offer alongside its generosity as a lever on outcomes. Agents whose counter-offers changed only one or two terms at a time kept agreeing as the cost of reading rose: at the highest cost tested, the strongest of them closed 87 per cent of sessions, against 58 per cent for an agent that conceded freely across every term.

Dr Hanke welcomed the poster as “a timely step in a conversation the University has been having, in one form or another, about how its decisions are received as well as how they are made”.

The University counts the poster among a widening body of cross-school work on how agreement travels between the parties to it, and on what each side spends to get there.

The full poster is available from the University’s research repository under an open licence, doi:10.5555/slop.m3kp54.