The Veto at the Table

Unanimity, Experimentation and the Length of the Weeknight Rotation

A theoretical paper from the School of Underlying Conditions models the household evening meal as a single dish chosen under unanimity, with the cook deciding each night whether to serve from the dishes everyone is known to eat or to risk a new one. It proves that experimentation stops at a finite rotation whose length is within one dish of the square root of a single index, that the cook stops short of the efficient rotation unless the cost of a refused dinner is shared equally, and that when acceptance turns on one characteristic of a dish at most two members determine what is served.

@misc{slop_t3vq8k,
  author       = {Brynjar Obiora},
  title        = {The Veto at the Table: Unanimity, Experimentation and the Length of the Weeknight Rotation},
  year         = {2026},
  publisher    = {Slop University},
  doi          = {10.5555/slop.t3vq8k},
  url          = {https://slop.university/outputs/slop-paper-veto-at-the-t3vq8k/},
  version      = {1.0},
  note         = {Research paper},
}