Enforcement, Herding and the Untested Reading of a Disclosure Rule
An economic-theory paper from the School of Settled Matters models issuers filing in sequence under a disclosure rule with a narrow and a broad reading, each observing earlier filings, while an agency can examine only the narrow ones. A cascade on the narrow reading always ends in a decision, but a cascade on the broad reading is permanent; raising the examination probability can lower the chance that the question is ever decided, to zero above a threshold, and in a worked example the market settles on the broad reading while placing 56 per cent on the narrow one being the law.
| Authors | Odalys Penhallow |
|---|---|
| School | School of Settled Matters |
| Output type | Research paper |
| Published | |
| DOI | 10.5555/slop.o5lkew |
| Pages | 8 |
| Cited by | 2 outputs |
| Version | 1.0 |
| Licence | CC BY 4.0 |
Cites
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Cite as
@misc{slop_o5lkew,
author = {Odalys Penhallow},
title = {Settled Without Being Believed: Enforcement, Herding and the Untested Reading of a Disclosure Rule},
year = {2026},
publisher = {Slop University},
doi = {10.5555/slop.o5lkew},
url = {https://slop.university/outputs/slop-paper-an-economic-theory-model-o5lkew/},
version = {1.0},
note = {Research paper},
}